

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

# FISCAL MONITOR

Climate Crossroads:  
Fiscal Policies in a Warming World

2023  
OCT



FISCAL AFFAIRS

## Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World


October 2023 Fiscal Monitor Analytical Chapter

Fiscal Affairs Department  
International Monetary Fund

# Countries pursue different climate policies but still leaving significant gaps to reach climate goals


## Annual Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1990–2050

(Billions of tons of carbon dioxide emissions equivalence)



## Impact of Current Policies on Emission Reduction

(Percent Reduction Below No-Pricing Counterfactual)



Sources: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Black, Parry, and Zhunussova 2023; and IMF staff estimates.

Source: IMF staff estimates using IMF-World Bank CPAT.

Note: Other policies or unspecified includes policies not quantified in this exercise or not yet specified by the authorities.

# Key Questions of the Fiscal Monitor

- 1. Can countries rely mostly on spending-based climate policies to achieve net-zero emissions?**
- 2. How can policymakers design politically feasible climate policies in a cost-effective and fiscally sustainable way?**
- 3. How can governments facilitate the green transition among firms?**

# Preview of Key Messages of the Fiscal Monitor

## **1. Can countries rely mostly on spending-based climate policies to achieve net-zero emissions?**

No. Scaling up spending-based policies would magnify inefficiency and put debt sustainability at risk.

## **2. How can policymakers design politically feasible climate policies in a cost-effective and fiscally sustainable way?**

The only way is to have an appropriate mix of policies, in which carbon pricing plays an integral part of the policies, supported by complementary policies.

## **3. How can governments facilitate the green transition among firms?**

Policies such as regulations and fiscal incentives can impact firm investment in low-carbon technology.


Green subsidies could work to promote the adoption of low-carbon technology if done well but also carries large risk.

# **1. Can Countries Scale Up Spending Measures to Reach Climate Goals?**

# Scaling up current spending-based policies put debt sustainability at risk

## Illustrative Debt Dynamics when Expanding Expenditure-Based Climate Policies

(Percent of GDP, cumulative change relative to 'business-as-usual' baseline)




Source: IMF staff simulations.

Simulations from a dynamic general equilibrium model. The lines for the advanced economy (large emerging market economy) cap the carbon price at \$75 (\$45) a ton. The solid lines scale up green public investment and subsidies (at 2 percent of GDP a year on average) to meet the net zero emissions target by 2050 (2060 for the emerging market economy), while the dashed lines have the same profile on carbon prices and a moderate rise in investment and subsidies, in line with International Energy Agency estimates.


# Government debt is rising faster than previously projected, while sizable investment needs among developing countries

**Global Government Debt, 2019-28** (Percent of GDP)




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database.

**Annual Investment Needs for Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development Goals, 2021-40** (Percent of GDP)



Sources: Aligishiev, Bellon, and Massetti 2022; and IMF staff estimates based on IMF's SDG Financing Tool.

# Countries are facing a policy trilemma






## **2. How to Strike a Balance on the Policy Trilemma?**

# Policies need to balance efficiency in climate mitigation, fiscal sustainability, and political feasibility

Mitigation Instruments		Desirability and Feasibility				Environmental Effectiveness by Sector						
Coverage	Instrument	Economic Efficiency	Revenue Mobilization	Administrative Practicality	Political Acceptability	Power	Industry	Transport	Buildings	Forestry/ Land use	Extractives (CH <sub>4</sub> )	Livestock (CH <sub>4</sub> , NO <sub>x</sub> )
Economywide policies	Carbon taxes	Green	Green	Green	Red	✓✓✓	✓✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓✓✓	✓✓✓
	Emission trading systems	Green	Light Green	Red	Yellow	✓✓✓	✓✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓✓	✓✓
Sectoral policies	Feebates (fees/rebates for dirty/clean firms/products/activities)	Light Green	Yellow	Yellow	Light Green	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓
	Tradable performance standards	Light Green	Yellow	Red	Light Green	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓			✓	✓
	Green subsidies	Light Green	Red	Yellow	Green	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Requirements for green technologies/activities	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	✓	✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓	✓
Complementary policies		Issue			Network externalities for clean technologies	Innovation market failures		Burdens on households		Burdens on firms		
		Instruments			Public investments	R&D incentives, timebound technology subsidies	Targeted assistance, equitable revenue use		Output-based rebates, tax relief, border adjustments			




- ✓ = Somewhat environmentally effective
- ✓✓ = Effective
- ✓✓✓ = Very effective




# Combination of balanced and well-sequenced instruments limits the rise in debt ...

**Illustrative Public Debt Dynamics and Composition**  
(cumulative deviation from 'business-as-usual scenario'; percent of GDP)

## Advanced economies



## Emerging market economies



Source: IMF staff simulations.



# ... and depends on countries' fiscal space, investment needs, and dependence on fossil fuels

## Illustrative Fiscal Balance and Composition

(cumulative deviation from 'business-as-usual scenario'; percent of GDP)

### Advanced economies


### Emerging market economies



Source: IMF staff simulations.

# Uncertainty surrounding the estimates of fiscal cost is large


## Sensitivity of Public Debt to Public Investment and Transfers for Emerging Market Economies (Percent of GDP relative to the business-as-usual scenario)



Source: IMF staff compilation.

Policy packages are set to reach net zero emissions by 2060. Parameters and fiscal instruments are calibrated to a representative emerging market, assumed to be the weighted average of large emerging market economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Türkiye). The baseline is the well-sequenced policy package discussed in the chapter, which consists of transfers at 30 percent of carbon revenues and public investment at about 3/4 percent of GDP. Alternative scenarios explore sensitivity on the size of transfers (higher at 50 percent of carbon revenues) and public investment (lower at 1/2 percent of GDP per year).


# Delaying carbon pricing is costly



Source: IMF staff simulations.


# Low-carbon technologies present opportunities and challenges

## Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing Capacity (Share in percent)



Source: International Energy Agency 2022.

## Learning Curves for Power Generation, by Technologies (US dollars per megawatt-hour)



Sources: IRENA 2022; Way and others 2022; and Ziegler and Trancik 2021a, 2021b.


Note: The figure shows the levelized cost of electricity: The average net present cost of electricity generation over the lifetime of the generator.




# Green subsidies can accelerate LCT adoption if done well and limit need for high carbon prices

## Impact of Technology Spillovers and Investment Bottlenecks on Debt Dynamics


1. Cumulative Deviation of Public Debt from 'Business-as-Usual' Baseline (Percent of GDP)



2. Reduction in Emissions Relative to 2023 Levels (Percent)



3. Carbon price (US dollars a ton)



— Illustrative well-designed policy package    - - - Presence of learning by doing    - - - Presence of investment bottlenecks


Source: IMF staff estimates.

Note: The figure assumes carbon prices are the same across scenarios before reaching net-zero-emission goals and is calibrated to a representative advanced economy (that reflects the average of the data for Group of Seven economies). When learning by doing is present, a 1 percent increase in energy capital is assumed to raise total factor productivity by 0.1 percent in the energy sector, in accordance with Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002) and Dietz and Stern (2015).

# The impact on fossil fuel exporters will vary


While global fossil fuel demand is expected to decline over the long-run, demand and supply movements during the transition are difficult to predict. Key factors:

- The pace of policy commitments and implementation around the globe
- Technological change
- Investment in fossil fuel supply
- Type of fossil fuel
- Extraction costs




Source: Boer and others (2023a).

Operational costs per barrel, USD



Source: [IMF April 2022 WEO](#); Rystad Energy Ucube; IMF Staff calculations;


# Some fossil fuel exporters are more exposed than others



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; UN Conference on Trade and Development; and IMF staff calculations.  
 Note: Commodity revenue includes all exploitable resources and fossil fuel revenue predominant among surveyed countries. Exports include other related primary products but exclude petrochemicals. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.

# Revenue impact will vary under different energy transition scenarios for fossil fuel exporters

(Percent of GDP)




Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The figure shows selected fossil fuel-producing countries where fossil fuel revenues make the highest contribution to total revenue as well as large new producers such as Guyana and Mozambique. The outlook in regard to energy markets is based on International Energy Agency (2022b), which considers scenarios involving "stated policies," "announced pledges," and net zero emissions. The green bar for the net-zero-policy scenario shows the revenue decline for most countries relative to actual fossil fuel revenues in 2019. The purple and red lines show the revenues generated in the announced-pledges and the stated-policies scenarios. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.

# **3. How can Governments Facilitate the Green Transition among Firms?**


# Policies impact firm investment in LCTs : Setting climate targets

## Likelihood of Investing in Mitigation: Low-Carbon Technology (Coefficient estimates)



Sources: European Investment Bank Group Survey on Investment and Investment Finance 2022;  
IMF staff estimates.


## Correlates of Firms Setting Climate Targets (Coefficient estimates)



Sources: European Investment Bank Group Survey on Investment and Investment Finance 2022;  
IMF staff estimates.

# Firms have been resilient during the recent energy price shocks with most firms passing through a portion of their cost increase


**Firms Passing Through Increases in Energy Costs**  
(Percent of firms surveyed)



Sources: The CFO Survey (Duke University, Richmond Fed, and Atlanta Fed) and the BIE (Atlanta Fed), Bundesbank and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The bars represent the proportion of firms who report passing on energy cost increases downstream

**Correlates of Pass-Through of Increase in Energy Costs**  
(Coefficient estimates, odds ratios)




Sources: The CFO Survey (Duke University, Richmond Fed, and Atlanta Fed) and the BIE (Atlanta Fed), Bundesbank and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The dots represent the coefficient estimates (odds ratios) of a logistic regression and the bars represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval. The outcome variable is whether the firm passed through any energy cost increase

# Other adjustment margins included investment in energy efficiency

## Impact of Energy Cost Increase on Firms' Performance and Adjustment Margins

(Percent of sampled firms)




Sources: Business Inflation Expectations survey (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta); Deutsche Bundesbank Online Panel; CFO survey (Duke University, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond); and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The figure shows the proportion of firms experiencing a rise in energy costs that indicated a change in output, employment, investment, profitability, energy consumption, energy efficiency, or the use of government support measures.




# Improvements in energy efficiency more likely for firms with plans to reduce emissions

**Correlates of Firms Reporting Increase in Energy Efficiency - US**  
(Coefficient estimates, odds ratios)



Sources: The CFO Survey (Duke University, Richmond Fed, and Atlanta Fed) and the BIE (Atlanta Fed and IMF staff estimates). Note: The dots represent the coefficient estimates (odds ratios) of a logistic regression and the bars represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval. The outcome variables is whether the firm passed reports increasing energy efficiency during the energy cost shock


**Correlates of Firms Reporting Increase in Energy Efficiency - Germany**  
(Coefficient estimates, odds ratios)



Sources: Bundesbank and IMF staff estimates. Note: The dots represent the coefficient estimates (odds ratios) of a logistic regression and the bars represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval. The outcome variables is whether the firm passed reports increasing energy efficiency during the energy cost shock

# Uncertainty regarding incentives provided by the Inflation Reduction Act and EU Green Deal will need to be resolved


**Firms Planning on Utilizing Incentives of EU Green Deal/US Inflation Reduction Act**  
(Percent of firms surveyed)



Sources: The CFO Survey (Duke University, Richmond Fed, and Atlanta Fed) and the BIE (Atlanta Fed), Bundesbank and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The chart represents the proportion of sample firms that report experiencing an increase in energy costs in 2022. The cost shock is further differentiated (right) into firms facing a small increase ( $\leq 50\%$ ) and a large increase ( $> 50\%$ )

**Firms' Plans for Utilizing Incentives of Climate Policy Packages in United States and Germany**  
(Percent of sampled firms)



Sources: The CFO Survey (Duke University, Richmond Fed, and Atlanta Fed) and the BIE (Atlanta Fed), Bundesbank and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The bars reflect the proportions of sampled firms who indicate that they will use incentives provided by the Inflation Reduction Act (US) and Green Deal (DEU) relative to whether they have indicated having plans for investment in emissions reduction. The dots represent the proportion of sampled firms who have indicated whether they have plans to invest in emissions reduction

# Key takeaways

1. Policymakers face a difficult trilemma. Current climate action insufficient to achieve a viable path to net zero emissions. Scaling up primarily through spending could put debt sustainability at risk. Raising revenue often crosses political red lines.
2. Countries have better, more-viable options but the devil is in the design.
3. The rise in debt during the green transition will be smaller if policy packages contain robust carbon pricing. Delayed action is costly.
4. Private sector should play a large role in climate actions and financing. Well-designed green subsidies and appropriate regulatory policies can encourage firms to invest in and adopt LCTs.




**Thank you**



# Background Slides

# The green transition brings close interactions among fiscal policies, climate, and macroeconomy.







# Modeling macro-fiscal and debt implications of net zero policies

**New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium Model** (Traum and Yang, 2015) adding **climate features**:

- **Energy** as a production function input, combines green and brown sources (CES):
  - **Green energy**: no emissions; requires public capital (complementary to private capital)
  - **Brown energy**: emissions proportional to output
- **Technology spillovers**: learning by doing in green and brown energy
- **Adjustment costs** to private investment to consider possible investment bottlenecks and stranded assets.
- **Hand-to-mouth households**: illustrate regressive aspects and need for transfers
- Accounts for household expectations and endogenous effects of policies on output, interest rates, and debt.
- **Fiscal policies**: carbon pricing, green public investment, green subsidies, transfers to households; other typical taxes (consumption, labor, and capital income).
  - Interest rates rising with debt-to-GDP ratio—particularly relevant for EMs with limited fiscal space.

# Simulated impact of policy package that contains both revenue and expenditure measures

## Key Dynamics on the Impact of Policy Package Combining Different Fiscal Instruments




Sources: IMF staff simulations.



## Firms' Investment in Adaptation and Mitigation

(Percent of firms surveyed in 2022)




Sources: European Investment Bank Group Survey on Investment and Investment Finance 2022; and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The graph shows the distribution of the country level share of firms investing in the corresponding climate measure across the European Union. The box and whiskers represent the interquartile range and lowest/highest share in the European Union, while red and orange dots represent the EU and US averages, respectively.

EU = European Union; US = United States.

## Europe: ETS Emissions and Climate Policy Stringency

(Metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, left scale; index, right scale)




Sources: European Union Transaction Log; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: The figure shows a simple average of market-based Environmental Policy Stringency indices of 21 European countries with available data. ETS = emission trading system.

# EU firm balance sheets have been resilient to environmental regulation

**Environmental Policy Stringency and Changes in EU Firms' Financials**  
(Coefficient estimates)



Sources: EU Emission Trading System; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; ORBIS; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: Figure shows estimated coefficients from a panel regression of 12 European countries over 1995–2020 based on EU ETS and Bureau van Dijk ORBIS data. Both panels include firm, country-sector, and year-sector fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The dependent variables are changes in input costs (material costs), turnover, profits (EBITDA), and fixed assets (in logarithms). Each coefficient estimate represents the impact from a change in OECD's market-based Environmental Policy Stringency index on the corresponding dependent variable. ETS-regulated firms are those with ETS-registered installations. Payable carbon emissions are calculated as the difference between verified emissions and free allowances. "High carbon price" is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 in years with the carbon prices exceeding the 75th percentile. The whiskers indicate the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimated coefficients. ETS = emission trading system.