

Resilience Amid Uncertainty: Will it Last?

DECEMBER 16, 2025

IMF-CEF, KUWAIT CITY



OCTOBER 2025 GLOBAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
AND CENTRAL ASIA DEPARTMENT

Recent Global Developments


The early 2025 global uncertainty shock has persisted but with relatively limited impact on global GDP and inflation ...

The World Uncertainty Index has risen further

In H1 GDP close to projections in the US and better than expected in China and EU


And global inflation continues to decline

Uncertainty Indices
(Index, GDP-weighted, seventy-one countries)




Source: Ahir, H, N Bloom, and D Furceri (2022), "World Uncertainty Index", NBER Working Paper.
Note: The indices include 14 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia region as follows: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Real GDP Growth, 2025:H1
(Year-over-year percent change)



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF, World Economic Outlook.
Note: Half-annual growth rates are calculated using half-annual GDP level data outturns and projections.

Headline Inflation
(Year-over-year percent change, 3-month moving average)



Sources: IMF, GDS database.


...with global financial markets brushing off shocks and uncertainties, although with unusual correlations between the US dollar and Treasury yields

Volatility rose in April but has retracted from the peak in April

The USD weakness persisted...


...with longer-term US Treasury and Bund yields diverging

Volatility Indices
(Index value)



Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.
Note: Data as of October 3, 2025.

US Dollar Exchange Rates
(Index, Nov 4th, 2024=100)



Sources: Haver Analytics; and Federal Reserve Board.
Note: Data as of September 25, 2025.

Ten-year US Treasury and German Bund Yields
(Percent)




Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF, World Economic Outlook.
Note: Data as of October 3, 2025.

Recent Developments in MENAP

Economic activity has been generally resilient in H1, while inflation slowed in MENA and accelerated in CCA

Real GDP growth generally strong in H1....


Real GDP Growth
(Year-over-year percent change)



Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Inflation generally fell in MENAP

Headline Inflation
(Year-over-year percent change)



Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Long-term average inflation is for the 2015–24 period.


Activity was supported by higher oil production, resilient remittances, and stronger tourism inflows...

OPEC+ accelerated the unwinding of previous production cuts

Remittances remained generally robust


Tourism sector strengthened in 2025

Change in Oil Production since December 2024 and Oil Price
(Thousand barrels per day)




Source: Joint Organizations Data Initiative; Haver Analytics; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; Rystad; and IMF staff calculations.

Inward Remittances
(Index, 2019:Q1=100)



Source: Haver Analytics; IMF, BOP database; and IMF Staff calculations.

Hotel Occupancy Rate
(Percent, 12-month moving average)



Source: CoStar; and IMF Staff calculations.


External financial conditions remained supportive

Sovereign spreads have continued to narrow since spring...

....portfolio net inflows picked up over the last few months ...


...and international bond issuances as of August have almost equaled the total for 2024

Sovereign Spreads
(Basis points)




Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Data are updated as of October 17, 2025.

EPFR Cumulative Weekly Portfolio Flows
(Billions of US dollars, since Jan. 2025)



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Data are updated on October 17, 2025.

Sovereign Eurobond Issuances
(Billions of USD)



Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Data are updated on October 17, 2025.


Outlook

Growth projections in 2025 were revised upward for many MENA and CCA economies, inflation is projected to moderate in both regions

Average 2025 GDP growth higher by 0.6 percentage point in MENAP, compared to May.


Inflation is projected to fall to 6.3 percent in 2030 in MENAP

Real GDP Growth Forecast and Revisions
(Year-over-year percent change)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.


Headline Inflation Forecast and Revisions
(Year-over-year percent change; end of period)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.


Generally tight fiscal and monetary policy stances

Fiscal balances generally expected to improve in 2027 compared to last year, with LICs as a notable exception



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations. Note: The fiscal impulse is calculated as the difference between the primary fiscal balance, with an inverted sign (so a negative fiscal impulse implies a tighter fiscal policy stance). The definition of the primary fiscal balance varies by country: for oil exporters, it refers to the annual non-oil primary fiscal balance expressed as a percentage of non-oil GDP; for oil importers, it refers to the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP.

Persistent high inflation justify tight monetary policy stances in Kazakhstan and Egypt



Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculation. Note: Ex-ante real policy rate is equal to difference between nominal policy rate and end of period inflation rate in 2027. For countries with peg to the USD a 2 percent inflation target is assumed. Neutral policy rates are estimated by staff as in Chapter2, MCD REO, April 2023. *Monetary Policy Where MENA and CCA Stands?*


Risks

The spike in global uncertainty: are we out of danger?


The World Uncertainty Index has risen further

Uncertainty spikes generally impact economic activity with a lag

World Uncertainty Indices
(Index, GDP-weighted seventy-one countries)



Impacts of Global Uncertainty Shocks on Real GDP Growth
(Percent, impact of a one standard deviation shock on uncertainty)



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2022); World Uncertainty Index (WUI) database; Torres Munguía and others (2022); Uppsala Georeferenced Event Database; Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Emergency Events Database EM-DAT; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data database; and IMF staff calculations. Note: On the left panel, monthly indices are available for 14 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia region, as follows: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. On the right panel, a local projections approach is used to assess the impacts of uncertainty. The shock happens in year 1 and corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in the GDP weighted World Uncertainty Index as measured by Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2022). Regressions include country fixed effects, two lags of the shock, two lags of the dependent variable, and control for domestic uncertainty, openness to trade, investment share, terms of trade shocks, trade partners' growth, control of corruption, conflict shocks, natural disasters, epidemics, Federal Reserve fund rates, and global oil prices. Shaded areas represent the 90 percent confidence interval. "Rest of the world" excludes countries in the CCA and MENA regions (and Pakistan); CCA = Caucasus and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East and North Africa (and Pakistan).


Higher interest rates, lower (higher?) oil prices, escalation (resolution?) of conflicts

A few MENA economies have high gross financing needs and banks with large exposure to public debt

Oil prices are projected to fall and remain low, in our baseline

Severe and persistent adverse effects from conflicts in MENA and CCA economies


Gross Financing Needs and Bank Exposures to Sovereign Debt, 2024
(Percent)



Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, International Finance Statistics database; Regional Economic Outlook database; World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.


Note: The sovereign nexus is calculated as banks' net claims on central, state, local governments, and state-owned enterprises, as a share of total bank assets. For Bahrain, it includes only bank claims on the general government.

Oil Price Forecasts
(US dollars per barrel)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.

Impact of Conflict on Real GDP per Capita
(Percent)




Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; Uppsala Georeferenced Event Database (v23.1); and IMF staff calculations.

Note: A local projections approach is used to assess the impacts of conflict. The shock occurs in year 1 and corresponds to an increase in conflict intensity to the 75th percentile of the world distribution.

Policy Priorities


Policy priority: rebuild fiscal and external buffers

Government debt projected to decline in most MENA oil importers but to remain at relatively high levels



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.

A few countries have very little foreign reserves




Sources: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.

Strong fiscal rules, more flexible ERs, and CB independence could strengthen resilience against negative shocks

Strong fiscal rules tend to be associated with lower sovereign spreads


Determinants of Sovereign Spreads
(Coefficient estimates, basis points)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; IMF, Fiscal Rules Database (Alonso and others, forthcoming); Bloomberg L.P.; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Using a sample of 57 countries over the period of 1996–2021, the regression specification includes fixed effects and a control for global financial market volatility, with clustered standard errors. A strong (weak) fiscal rule is defined as a score in the top (bottom) third of the Fiscal Rule Strength Index distribution. Hollow bars indicate that the association is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

More flexible ERs help reduce losses from external shocks


Impact of a Global Uncertainty Shock on Real GDP Growth
(Percent real GDP change one year after shock)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; IMF, The Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions database; Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2022); World Uncertainty Index (WUI) database; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data database; Uppsala Georeferenced Event Database; Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Emergency Events Database EM-DAT; IMF, Financial Development Index Database; UNCTAD, UNCTAD Stat Merchandise Trade Matrix; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: A local projections approach with controls is used to assess the impacts of global shocks. The shock corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase in the GDP-weighted World Uncertainty Index (Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri, 2022). * denotes a statistically significant difference between the two groups of economies.

Central bank independence can help against inflation over the medium-term

MENA Region: Estimated Cumulative Impact of Increase in CBI Index on Inflation
(Percent relative to baseline)




Sources: Gershenson and others (forthcoming); and IMF staff calculations.


Structural reforms are increasingly necessary, as new challenges compound long-standing ones

MENA and CCA middle- and low-income countries are less prepared to adopt AI than advanced economies

But the adoption of AI should include efforts to prevent its negative effect on unemployment




Sources: Cazzaniga and others (2024), AI Preparedness Index; and IMF staff calculations.



Sources: International Labour Organization, Labor Force Statistics, and IMF staff calculations.


Long-term priorities: reduce state dominance, improve governance, gender and financial inclusion, diversify the economy

A significant presence of State Owned Enterprises



Sources: OECD (2015a); national country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Saudi Arabia reporting is limited to the portfolio of entities under the remit of the reporting institution and therefore cannot be considered wholly representative of the national SOE portfolio. Number of SOEs in Algeria is representative of SOEs with 90%-100% government ownership.

Large gaps in governance, gender and financial inclusion



Sources: IMF staff calculations.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

PROMOTING INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Pandemic World

Editors

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Thank you